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INTRODUCTION

The first three quarters of 2009 generated the largest decline in state tax
revenues nationwide since 1963.1 On the heels of the 2007 recession, the
corporate income tax decreased 13% nationwide in fiscal year 2009, after having
fallen 4.7% in fiscal year 2008.2 Moreover, state corporate income taxes have
generally experienced steady declines over the past twenty years3 largely due
to aggressive tax planning strategies.4 Despite accounting for $268,643,839 of
South Carolina's tax revenues in fiscal year 2008-2009,s the South Carolina
corporate income tax has suffered under a separate entity reporting
apportionment regime.6

1. Lucy Dadayan & Donald J. Boyd, Recession or No Recession, State Tax Revenues
Remain Negative, 78 NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. Gov'T ST. REVENUE REP., Jan. 2010, at 1, 1,

available at http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government finance/state revenue report/2010-01-07SRR 78.pdf.
2.
ANDREw PHILLIPS ET AL., ERNST & YOUNG LLP WITH COUNCIL ON STATE TAXATION,
TOTAL STATE AND LOCAL BUSINESS TAXES: STATE-BY-STATE ESTIMATES FOR FISCAL YEAR

2009, at 3 (2010), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Total-state-and-localbusiness-taxes-March-2010/$FILE/Total-state-and-local-business-taxes-March-2010.pdf.
3.
Sanjay Gupta et al., Empirical Evidence on the Revenue Effects of State Corporate
Income Tax Policies, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 237, 237 (2009). But see Lucy Dadayan & Donald J. Boyd,
State Tax Revenues Gained New Strength in Fourth Quarter, 82 NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST.
Gov'T ST. REVENUE REP., Feb. 2011, at 1, 9, available at http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/

government finance/state revenue report/2011-02-01-SRR 82.pdf ("Among 46 states that have a
corporate income tax, 15 reported declines for the third quarter of 2010 compared to the same
quarter of the previous year; 9 states saw double-digit declines. Twenty-six states reported doubledigit growth and five states reported single-digit growth.").
4.

See generally DAVID BRUNORI, STATE TAX POLICY 104 (2001) ("[C]orporations

generally have the resources to plan-and when necessary to dispute-tax matters. Specifically,
corporations are able to employ highly trained and skilled lawyers, accountants, and economists....
To meet the companies' intellectual firepower, the states must hire, train, and retain equally
qualified tax professionals. Although the state corporate income tax raises very little revenue
compared with other levies, it devours a disproportionate amount of planning and litigation
resources.").
5.

Fast Facts: South Carolina'sCorporate Income Tax, S.C. POLICY COUNCIL (Sept. 17,

2009),
http://www.scpolicycouncil.com/research-and-publications-/budget/780-fast-facts-southcarolinas-corporate-income-tax.
6.

See generally S.C. TAXATION REALIGNMENT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 153 (2010)

[hereinafter TRAC REPORT], available at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/citizensinterestpage/
TRAC/FinalDocuments/TRACFinalReport.pdf ("Separate entity reporting creates a potentially
massive tax loophole for corporations capable of taking advantage. While the system is very
attractive to those companies, it creates a number of problems for the state, as well as for those
corporations incapable of seizing its benefits.").
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In Media General Communications, Inc. v. South CarolinaDepartment of

Revenue,7 the South Carolina Supreme Court unanimously approved the use of
combined entity reporting methods under the statutory corporate income tax
distortion relief provision. Combined entity apportionment, or "combined
reporting," is a neutral corporate income tax apportionment method that
diminishes corporate tax avoidance by capturing intercompany transactions that
shift the income of multistate corporations from one state to another.9 Going
forward, Media General is significant because it provides the South Carolina
Department of Revenue with a potentially significant tool in its efforts to restore
and levy a fair state corporate income tax.10
This Note provides an analysis of combined reporting in the context of
section 12-6-2320(A)(4) of the South Carolina Code, which addresses
instances of income distortion for corporate taxpayers.12 In particular, this Note
focuses on combined reporting as a means of ensuring a fair corporate income
tax for both the South Carolina Department of Revenue and corporate taxpayers
alike. Part II of this Note examines the mechanics and landscape of the separate
and combined reporting methods, South Carolina's history as a non-combined
reporting state, and the Media General decision. Next, Part III asserts that-in
light of the application of the corporate income tax distortion relief provision in
Carmax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of

Revenue,13 recent efforts to utilize combined reporting, and the fact that
combined reporting nullifies most common tax avoidance mechanisms-the
South Carolina Supreme Court correctly decided Media General. Part IV
addresses the lack of uniformity across other states that have enacted the same
distortion relief provision as South Carolina and examines those states' burden
of proof standards, suggesting that California's clear and convincing evidence
standard should be applied to determine under what circumstances the South
Carolina Department of Revenue and taxpayers should be allowed to invoke
combined reporting as equitable apportionment. Part V discusses the Final
Report of the South Carolina Taxation Realignment Commission, issued

December 2010, which recommends that the General Assembly should consider
enacting combined reporting.14 Finally, Part VI concludes that use of combined

7. 388 S.C. 138, 694 S.E.2d 525 (2010).
8. See id. at 152, 694 S.E.2d at 532.
9. See William F. Fox et al., How Should a Subnational Corporate Income Tax on
Multistate Businesses Be Structured?,58 NAT'L TAX J. 139, 146-47 (2005).
10. See generally id. at 146 ("In general, manipulation of the separate reporting regime
means firms can influence their tax base .

. .

. [S]tates have responded to the obvious flaws of

separate reporting by requiring firms to report on a combined basis the operations of all commonly
controlled entities involved in a unitary operation.").
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2320(A)(4) (2000 & Supp. 2009).
12. See id.
13. See Carmax Auto Superstores W. Coast, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, No. 09-ALJ-170160-CC (S.C. Admin. Law Ct. Apr. 22, 2010).
14. TRAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 169.
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reporting as a form of alternative apportionment in South Carolina is a necessary
step toward securing the most equitable corporate income tax.
Although South Carolina remains a separate entity apportionment state
following Media General,1 5 combined reporting will provide South Carolina
corporate taxpayers with the ability to combine income and losses among related
companies.16 Most importantly, this method of apportionment takes into account
unquantifiable flows of value among corporate taxpayers operating as a unitary
business and effectively eliminates intercompany income-shifting transactions.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Corporate Income Tax Apportionment: A Comparisonof Combined and
Separate Reporting

The combined reporting method for apportioning corporate income requires
each entity within a group of multiple corporations to file returns "on a
combined basis,"18 and effectively treats the group as a single company by
combining the income and expenses of parent and subsidiary corporations and
considering that entire amount in one combined report. 19 As a general matter,
for a state constitutionally to assess an income tax against a corporation, the
corporation must have a nexus with the taxing state. 20 That is, "some definite
link, some minimum connection" must exist between the corporation's incomegenerating activities and the taxing state.21 Where a nexus is present, the state
where the company conducts business activities may assess a fair tax on overall
profits utilizing an apportionment ratio that accounts for combined business

15. See id. at 151 ("South Carolina is a separate entity state, and generally treats related
corporations as if they were unrelated. South Carolina does not normally apportion the income of
related corporations together, even when they are part of one unitary business.").
16. See id. at 159.
17. See id.
18. Fox et al., supra note 9, at 146.
19. See Michael Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters and the Need for "Combined
Reporting," CENTER ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, 1 (Oct. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Mazerov,
State CorporateTax Shelters], http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-26-07sfp.pdf.
20. See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1983)
("The Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution do not allow a State to tax income
arising out of interstate activities-even on a proportional basis-unless there is a minimal
connection or nexus between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a rational relationship
between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise." (quoting
Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1980)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954) ("[D]ue process requires
some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or
transaction it seeks to tax."). Pursuant to statute, South Carolina asserts a nexus over corporations
"transacting, conducting, or doing business" in South Carolina, and this includes "transacting or
engaging in any activity for the purpose of financial profit or gain." S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-530
(2000).
21. Miller Bros. Co., 347 U.S. at 344-45.
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activities in the state in relation to the overall business activity of the collective
group.22 Because most corporations conduct business in multiple states, "each
state with which a corporation has nexus must devise rules for dividing the
corporation's profits into an in-state portion and an out-of-state portion-a
process known as 'apportionment."' 23 In other words, taxable income is
apportioned to the taxing state based on that state's apportionment formula, and
the taxing state has the authority to tax only the in-state portion of the corporate
profits. 24 In contrast to combined reporting, separate reporting disregards the
aggregate business activities and profits of any related companies, and instead
requires each individual corporate entity to file a separate tax return that includes
only the income of the individual entity.25
As a general matter, corporations conducting business only partially within
South Carolina are only subject to income taxes based on the portion of their
business activities within the state; the Department of Revenue determines that
portion by allocating and apportioning the income, with the sum of those figures
representing taxable income. 26 After allocating a corporation's income, the
Department will apportion the remaining income in accordance with section 126-2240,27 which until 2011 generally involved the use of a "'four factor'
apportionment method . . . based on property, payroll, and double-weighted
sales."28 For tax years starting in 2011, "[t]he 'single sales factor' apportionment
method will replace the 'four factor' apportionment method."2 9 Under the new
single sales factor apportionment method, a taxpayer's income apportioned to
South Carolina "is [determined] by multiplying the net income remaining after
allocation [pursuant to sections] 12-6-2220 and 12-6-2230 by the sales factor
defined in [Section] 12-6-2280," and in the absence of a sales factor, "the
remaining net income is apportioned to the business's principal place of
business."30 Regarding the four-factor apportionment formula, the property
factor referred to "the average value of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal
property" rented or owned in South Carolina during the taxable year, divided by
all property rented or owned everywhere (including South Carolina) over the

22. See id. at 345 ("[I]ncorporation by a state or permission to do business there forms the
basis for proportionate taxation of a company, including its franchise, capital, income and
property." (footnotes omitted) (citing numerous Supreme Court cases in support of this principle)).
23.

Corporate Income Tax Apportionment and the "Single Sales Factor," INST. ON TAX'N &

ECON. POL'Y, 1 (Nov. 2008), http://www.itepnet.org/pdf/pb1ssf.pdf.
24. Id.
25. See Fox et al., supra note 9, at 144-45.
26.

TRAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 143-44.

27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2240 (2000).
28. TRAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 144; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2250 (2000)
(repealed for tax years after 2010).
29. TRAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 144; see also id at 147 (explaining the "phase in" of the
single sales factor method for tax years 2007-2010).
30. Id. at 146.
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taxable year.31 The payroll factor consisted of the total figure the taxpayer paid
for compensation in South Carolina during the taxable year, divided by the total
compensation paid everywhere over that period.32 Additionally, the sales factor
continues to consist of sales made in South Carolina during the taxable year
divided by the entity's total sales during the taxable year.33
In Container Corp. ofAmerica v. FranchiseTax Board,34 the United States

Supreme Court extolled the virtues of combined reporting as a method for
measuring a unitary group's business income because of its ability to account
for "functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of
scale."35 The Court explained:
The unitary business/formula apportionment method is a very
different approach to the problem of taxing businesses operating in more
than one jurisdiction.
It rejects geographical or transactional
accounting, and instead calculates the local tax base by first defining the
scope of the "unitary business" of which the taxed enterprise's activities
in the taxing jurisdiction form one part, and then apportioning the total
income of that "unitary business" between the taxing jurisdiction and
the rest of the world on the basis of a formula taking into account
objective measures of the corporation's activities within and without the
jurisdiction. 36
Additionally, the Court more recently extended the Containerholding to the
international context in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board.37

Addressing a challenge brought by members of a foreign-based
multinational corporation,3 the Court upheld the application of California's
corporate tax scheme and expressly stated that corporate taxpayers "had an
adequate nexus with the State, that worldwide combined reporting led to
taxation which was fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, fairly related to

31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2260(A) (2000) (repealed for tax years after 2010). The property
factor did not include any "cash, shares of stock, bonds, notes, accounts receivables, credits, special
privileges, franchises, goodwill, or evidences of debt." Id. at § 12-6-2260(B).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2270(A) (2000) (repealed for tax years after 2010). Under subsection (B), compensation included "salaries, wages, commissions, and other personal service
compensation paid or incurred." Id. at § 12-6-2270(B).
33. Id. at § 12-6-2280 (2000 & Supp. 2010). For an illustration of the difference between
separate and combined reporting, see infra Appendix A.
34. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
35. Id. at 181 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. at 165.
37. 512 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1994).
38. Id. at 302.
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the services provided by the State, and that its imposition did not result
inevitably in multiple taxation." 39
B. South Carolina Corporate Income Tax Apportionment Before Media

General
Similar to many other states in the Southeast,40 South Carolina has
historically neither allowed nor mandated the use of combined reporting,41 and
the Department of Revenue has instead maintained a steadfast adherence to
separate reporting.42 The Department likely took this position to provide
predictability for corporate taxpayers following a wave of cases that established
South Carolina as a separate entity reportin state.
In Emerson Electric Co. v. Wasson,4 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a parent corporation and its subsidiary could not combine the sales
factor in the three-factor apportionment formula in its consolidated income tax
return. 44 Emerson Electric Company (Emerson) and its wholly owned
subsidiary, Therm-O-Disc, Inc. (TOD), filed a consolidated income tax return for
the fiscal year 1977-1978 in accordance with South Carolina tax law.4 5
Emerson conducted business in forty-four states (including South Carolina), but
TOD only conducted business activities in Ohio and South Carolina.46
Construing the language of the applicable statute, the court concluded, "The
legislature's use of the plural 'taxpayers' instead of 'taxpayer' indicates that
corporations filing consolidated returns are not to be considered a single

39.

Id. at 303, 330.

40. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FOX ET AL., TENN. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY WITH DEP'T
OF REVENUE & DEP'T OF ECON. & CMTY. DEV., AN EVALUATION OF COMBINED REPORTING IN

THE TENNESSEE CORPORATE FRANCHISE AND EXCISE TAXES 8 fig.1 (Rev. 2009) [hereinafter
TENN. COMBINED REPORTING EVALUATION], available at http://www.tn.gov/comptroller/shared/

pdf/CBERo2OCombined20Reporting2ORevisedl03009.pdf (illustrating, as of January 2009,
the continued use of separate reporting in Southeastern states in contrast to much of the rest of the
United States).
41.

See RICK HANDEL ET AL., SOUTH CAROLINA CORPORATE INCOME TAXES pt. 05, at 27-

28 (Rev. 2005), available at http://www.sctax.org/NR/rdonlyres/5A46BB45-9251-4900-85D5-1BB
678EF93DE/0/05AllocationApportion.pdf ("South Carolina is a separate entity state, and generally
treats related corporations as if they were unrelated. South Carolina does not normally apportion
the income of related corporations together, even when they are part of one unitary business.").
42. See DEANA WEST ET AL., S.C. DEP'T REVENUE, SOUTH CAROLINA TAX INCENTIVES FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 10-11 (2009 winter ed.) [hereinafter S.C. TAX INCENTIVES REPORT],

available at http://www.northcharleston.org/client resources/econdev/files/tax incentives 2009.
pdf.
43. 287 S.C. 394, 339 S.E.2d 118 (1986).
44. See id. at 396-97, 339 S.E.2d at 120.
45. See id. at 394-95, 339 S.E.2d at 119. The corporation's filing was pursuant to section
12-7-1570, which is no longer in force. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1570 (1976) (repealed 1995).
46. Emerson, 287 S.C. at 395, 339 S.E.2d at 119.
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entity." 47 Accordingly, the court held that the subsidiary's sales could not be
distributed among the forty-four states in which the parent conducted business.48
Later, in NCR Corp. v. South CarolinaTax Commission (NCR 1),4 9 the South
Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its reasoning in Emerson.50 The taxpayer,
NCR, was a multinational corporation that developed, manufactured, marketed,
installed, and serviced business information processing systems; moreover, it
conducted all of these activities partly within South Carolina between 1981 and
1983.51 During this time, NCR conducted business through "approximately
eighteen foreign branches and seventy-five foreign subsidiaries doing business in
approximately one hundred fifty-nine countries," most of which NCR wholly
owned, but which had no business activities in South Carolina.52 In making its
assessment, the Tax Commission had not included any foreign subsidiary sales,
property, or payroll amounts in its apportionment factors, but it had included
foreign subsidiar7 royalty and interest income amounts in NCR's total income
for tax purposes. Citing Emerson and employing the same analysis, the court
stated that parent and subsidiary corporations are separate entities for purposes
of statutory apportionment.54
In rejecting NCR's statutory construction argument, the court explained,
"South Carolina is not taxing the income of NCR's subsidiaries, but instead only
the income of NCR itself as a separate corporate entity. Consequently,
subsidiary payroll, sales, and property also should generally not be considered
under our statutory scheme."ss Quoting the Minnesota Supreme Court, the court
further noted, "Because NCR is the only 'taxpayer' involved in this case, the
apportionment statute contemplates that only its factors of property used, payroll
paid, and sales made are relevant for inclusion in the denominator of the
apportionment function." 5 6 Even so, the court remanded the case with guidelines
for calculating NCR's taxable income and ordered the trial court to compare that
figure to the amount assessed by the Tax Commission in order to determine
whether there was "a gross disparity between the two amounts of constitutional
proportions."

47. Id at 397, 339 S.E.2d at 120.
48. See id at 396-97, 339 S.E.2d at 120.
49. 304 S.C. 1, 402 S.E.2d 666 (1991), superseded by statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2320
(2000), as recognized in Media General Conunc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 388 S.C. 138,
694 S.E.2d 525 (2010).
50. See id at 5-6, 402 S.E.2d at 669 (citing Emerson, 287 S.C. at 397, 339 S.E.2d at 120).
51. Id. at 3, 402 S.E.2d at 667-68.
52. Id. at 3, 402 S.E.2d at 668.
53. Id. at 4, 402 S.E.2d at 668.
54. See id. at 5-6, 402 S.E.2d at 669 (citing Emerson, 287 S.C. at 397, 339 S.E.2d at 120).
55. Id. at 6, 402 S.E.2d at 669.
56. Id. (quoting NCR Corp. v. Conn'r of Revenue, 438 N.W.2d 86, 91 (Minn. 1989)).
57. Id. at 14-15, 402 S.E.2d at 674.
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In NCR Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Commission (NCR II),

the South

Carolina Supreme Court issued its second decision involving NCR, which had
challenged two of the steps used by the trial court to calculate NCR's taxable
income on remand from the supreme court.59 NCR argued that the royalties and
the interest income paid by each of its forty-four subsidiaries should have first
been added together, and then "divided by the combined income of all the
subsidiaries to determine the proportionate contribution of sales, property, and
payroll by foreign subsidiaries."6 0 In effect, NCR's preferred combined
reporting method would have allowed the losses of some subsidiaries to offset
gains of others during the relevant taxable period. 61 The court concluded that
subsidiaries should be treated as separate entities for purposes of calculating
taxable income, and rejected NCR's request for combined reporting. 62
The same year it decided NCR II, the South Carolina Supreme Court also
issued a landmark decision in Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax

Commission,63 permitting the state to tax the income of foreign corporations
that direct business activities towards South Carolina under the separate
64
reporting method. In that case, the taxpayer, Geoffrey, Inc. (Geoffrey), was a
subsidiary corporation owned by Toys R Us, Inc. (Toys R Us) and incorporated
in Delaware, that had no employees, offices, or tangible property in South
Carolina.65 Toys R Us began conducting business in South Carolina in 1985,
and, since that date, Geoffre had continuously received royalty payments from
Toys R Us's in-state sales. When Toys R Us deducted those payments from
its taxable income, the South Carolina Tax Commission disallowed the
deduction at first, but eventually allowed it and determined that Geoffrey was
required to pay taxes on its royalty income pursuant to section 12-7-230 of the

58. 312 S.C. 52, 439 S.E.2d 254 (1993), superseded by statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2320
(2000), as recognized in Media General Commc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 388 S.C. 138,
694 S.E.2d 525 (2010).
59. See id. at 55, 439 S.E.2d at 256.
60. Id. at 56, 439 S.E.2d at 256. Instead, NCR's taxable income had been calculated as
follows:
The trial judge used a pro rata method to calculate the proportion of sales, property,
and payroll of foreign subsidiaries to be included in the denominator of the
apportionment formula. He took the amount of royalties and income interest paid by a
foreign subsidiary to NCR, divided it by that subsidiary's total income, and multiplied the
resulting fraction by the total sales, property, and payroll of the subsidiary. This
proportion . . . was then added to the denominator of the apportionment formula and
NCR's taxable income was determined accordingly.
Id. at 55, 439 S.E.2d at 256.
61. See id. at 56, 439 S.E.2d 256.
62. See id.
63. 313 S.C. 15, 437 S.E.2d 13 (1993).
64. See id. at 16, 21, 23-24, 437 S.E.2d at 15, 17-19.
65. Id. at 16, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
66. See id. at 17, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
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South Carolina Code.67 Geoffrey protested the tax and argued that because it
was a foreign corporation that lacked a sufficient nexus with the state, the
Commission could not constitutionally tax that income." 68 Addressing
Geoffrey's argument, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated:
Section 12-7-230 levies a tax on the income of foreign corporations
"transacting, conducting, doing business, or having an income within the
jurisdiction of this State," which "includes," but is not limited to, "the
engaging in or the transacting of any activity in this State for the
purpose of financial profit or gain." We construe this language as
extending to the limits of the constitution South Carolina's authority to
tax foreign corporations. Here, Geoffrey contends that the Due Process
Clause and the Commerce Clause prohibit the taxation of its royalty
income by South Carolina. We disagree.69
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the asserted nexus
comported with due process because Toys R Us had paid Geoffrey for the use of
its trademarks and Toys R Us's sales in South Carolina had generated an account
receivable for Geoffrey-both of which evidenced Geoffrey's purposeful
direction of business activity toward the state.70 Moreover, the court concluded
that Geoffrey's Commerce Clause attack was without merit,7 1 and also rejected
the physical presence test for establishing nexus articulated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.

In sum, Geoffrey held that where a

67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-230 (1977 & Supp. 1992); see also Geoffrey, 313 S.C. at 17, 437
S.E.2d at 15.
68. See Geoffrey, 313 S.C. at 17-18, 437 S.E.2d at 15.
69. Id. at 18, 437 S.E.2d at 15-16 (citations omitted).
70. See id. at 18-24, 437 S.E.2d at 16-18. The court concluded that Geoffrey's agreements
with Toys R Us indicated that Geoffrey willingly sought to conduct business in South Carolina. Id.
at 19, 437 S.E.2d at 16 ("By electing to license its trademarks and trade names for use by Toys R Us
in [South Carolina], ... Geoffrey has been aware of, consented to, and benefitted from Toys R Us's
use of Geoffrey's intangibles in South Carolina. Moreover, Geoffrey had the ability to control its
contact with South Carolina by prohibiting the use of its intangibles here as it did with other
states.").
71. See id. at 23, 437 S.E.2d at 18. To survive a challenge under the Commerce Clause, a tax
must: (1) be applied to an activity having a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) be fairly
apportioned, (3) "not discriminate against interstate commerce," and (4) have a relation to the
services the state provides. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
72. 504 U.S. 298 (1992); see also Geoffrey, 313 S.C. at 21, 437 S.E.2d at 17. In Quill, the
Court upheld a bright-line rule requiring physical presence in a taxing state in order to be subject to
that state's sales or use tax. See 504 U.S. at 317-18. However, the court in Geoffrey addressed the
application of South Carolina's corporate income tax and concluded, "Geoffrey's purposeful
direction of activity toward South Carolina as well as its possessing intangible property here provide
a definite link between South Carolina and the income derived by Geoffrey from the use of its
trademarks and trade names in this State." 313 S.C. at 23, 347 S.E.2d at 17. See generally Report
of the Task Force on Business Activity Taxes and Nexus of the ABA Section of Taxation State and
Local Taxes Committee, 62 TAX LAW. (ST. & Loc. TAX EDITION) 935, 958 (2009) [hereinafter
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foreign corporation such as Geoffrey licenses intangibles to be used in South
Carolina and derives income as a result, that corporation will have a "substantial
nexus" with the state.73
The Geo frey nexus has proven essential to South Carolina as a separate
entity state. Unlike many other non-combined states, South Carolina does not
operate under statutes containing "addback provisions for related-party royalty
or intangible expenses and interest expenses." 75 Consequently, the Geoffrey
nexus has meant that South Carolina has not been completely defenseless to taxavoidance schemes used by multistate corporations having intangible assets in
the state. 76 Nevertheless, multistate corporations likely can avoid a Geoffrey
nexus by operating under less specific agreements than in Geoffrey and by not
keeping any accounts receivable in South Carolina.77
C. South Carolinaand UDITPA Section 18

In 1957, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
drafted the Uniform Divisions of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) to
establish a national uniform foundation by which states could allocate and

Report on Business Activity Taxes and Nexus] ("Geoffrey sent shock waves through the business

community when it was decided in 1993 as it represented a substantial departure from its commonly
held belief that the United States Supreme Court in Quill had continued to uphold a requirement of
physical presence' in a state before a business activity tax liability could be imposed.").
73. Geoffrey, 313 S.C. at 23-24, 347 S.E.2d at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Report on Business Activity Taxes and Nexus, supra note 72, at 958 ("[T]he court's holding

stressed that it was the combination of the presence of the licensed intangibles in the State and the
royalty income derived from their use in the State that constituted 'substantial nexus."' (quoting
Geojfrey, 313 S.C. at 23, 347 S.E.2d at 18)).
74.

See generally Report on Business Activity Taxes and Nexus, supra note 72, at 956-57

("One area in which the state taxing authorities have found some success is on the issue of whether
the 'presence' of intangible personal property in a state can create nexus for business activity tax
purposes.... The seminal state case ... is Geoffrey, Inc. v. South CarolinaTax Commission.").
75. TENN. COMBINED REPORTING EVALUATION, supra note 40, at 11; see also TRAC

REPORT, supra note 6, at 151. These related party addback statutes require that certain types of
intercompany payments-between in-state payors and out-of-state payee affiliates, which the instate payor deducts from its taxable income-be added back to the taxable income of the paying
company.

See TENN. COMBINED REPORTING EVALUATION, supra note 40, at 11.

Currently,

twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have addback provisions, which are also called
"throwback rules because they identify nowhere income and throw it back into a state where it will
be taxed."

Kail M. Padgitt, 2011 State Business Tax Climate Index, TAX FOUND., 16 (Oct. 26,

2010), http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/bp60.pdf. At least eleven separate entity states have
enacted addback provisions that focus primarily on "royalties paid for the use of trademarks,
tradenames, or patents." Thomas H. Steele & Pilar M. Sansone, Surveying Constitutional Theories
for Challenges to the Addback Statutes, 2005 ST. TAX NOTES 613, 613.
76. See TENN. COMBINED REPORTING EVALUATION, supra note 40, at 11. For a discussion
of when a Geoffrey nexus exists, see S.C. DEP'T OF REVENUE, Revenue Ruling 08-01, available at

http://www.sctax.org/NR/rdonlyres/D7C8161C-3764-45BA-99BB-BEC5C8D354A//RRO81.
pdf.
77.

See TRAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 158.
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apportion the income of multistate corporations for corporate taxation.
In
1995, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted section 12-6-2320,79 which
is nearly identical to UDITPA section 18,80 and states the following:
(A) If the allocation and apportionment provisions of this chapter do
not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this
State, the taxpayer may petition for, or the department may require, in
respect to all or any part of the taxpayer's business activity, if
reasonable:
(1) separate accounting;
(2) the exclusion of one or more of the factors;
(3) the inclusion of one or more additional factors which will fairly
represent the taxpayer's business activity in this State; or
(4) the employment of any other method to effectuate an equitable
allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer's income.81
The language in UDITPA section 18(A)(4) has served as authority in other states
that have addressed imposing combined reporting as a form of alternative
apportionment.82 The comment to section 18 states:
Section 18 is intended as a broad authority, within the principle of
apportioning business income fairly among the states which have
contact with the income, to the tax administrator to vary the
apportionment formula and to vary the system of allocation where the
provisions of the Act do not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's
business activity in the state. 83
Additionally, Professor William J. Pierce, one of the original drafters of
UDITPA, discussed when equitable apportionment should be used under section
18:

78. See UNIF. DIv. OF INCOIE FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT prefatory note (1957).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2320(A) (2000).
80. UNIF. DIV. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 18 (1957).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Leathers v. Jacuzzi, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Ark. 1996) ("[T]here is a
discretionary provision in UDITPA upon which combined reporting can be allowed and, in fact, is
allowed by a number of states.").
83. UNIF. DIV. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 18 cmt. (1957).
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[D]epartures from the basic formula should be avoided except where
reasonableness requires. Nonetheless, some alternative method must be
available to handle the constitutional problem as well as the unusual
cases, because no statutory pattern could ever resolve satisfactorily the
problems for the multitude of taxpayers with individual business
characteristics. 84
Accordingly, following the General Assembly's enactment of section 12-6-2320
in 1995, a platform for combined reporting existed in South Carolina to provide
broad equitable apportionment when reasonable in cases of distortion.
D. Waves of Change: Media General Communications, Inc. v. South
Carolina Department of Revenue
Prior to 2010, the use of combined reporting to fairly reflect affiliated
taxpayers' business activities under UDITPA section 18 had not been addressed
in South Carolina.
In Media General, the South Carolina Supreme Court
recognized the use of combined reporting under section 12-6-2320(A)(4) where
affiliated taxpayers sought a 435% decrease in corporate income tax liability. 8 6
The court determined that the South Carolina Department of Revenue's general
entitlement to deference in controversial state tax issues was not absolutelegislative intent trumped counterintuitive interpretations of the distortion relief
provision-and that South Carolina's precedents rejecting combined reporting
were no longer controlling. Although the taxpayers prevailed in Media
General, the opinion's true significance derives from the Department's future
ability to impose a neutral fair corporate income tax by using combined reporting
in distortive cases under section 12-6-2320(A)(4)."

84.

William J. Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax Purposes, 35 TAXES

747, 781 (1957).
85. See Media Gen. Commc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 388 S.C. 138, 147, 694 S.E.2d
525, 529 (2010). Jurisdictions that had considered this issue disagreed as to whether UDITPA
section 18 permitted combined reporting as an acceptable alternative method. Compare Leathers v.
Jacuzzi, Inc. 935 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Ark. 1996) (recognizing combined reporting as an alternative
method under UDITPA section 18(A)(4)), and Coca Cola Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 533 P.2d 788,
793-94 (Or. 1975) (same), with Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 561 A.2d 172, 173-74
(Me. 1989) (denying the use of combined reporting as equitable apportionment under UDITPA
section 18(A)(4)), and Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Huddleston, 880 S.W.2d 682, 688 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1994) (same).
86.

See Media Gen., 388 S.C. at 151-52, 694 S.E.2d at 532.

87. See id. at 149-51, 694 S.E.2dat530-31.
88. See id. at 152, 694 S.E.2d at 532 ("[T]he Department may employ any other appropriate
alternative method for future tax years.").
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1. An Illustration of Severe Distortion in the South Carolina
CorporateIncome Tax

The taxpayers in Media Generalcomprised a unitary group, which the court
described as "a business in which there is a high degree of interrelationship and
interdependence among related entities so that the value of the business as a
whole exceeds the sum of its individual elements."8 9 Specifically, Media
General, Inc. (Media General) was an independent, publicly owned
communications company, which was domiciled in and subject to tax in
Virginia. 90 Media General affiliates-Media General Communications (MGC),
Media General Operations (MGO), and Media General Broadcasting of South
Carolina Holdings, Inc (MGB)-conducted operations involving newspapers,
television, and interactive media in the Southeast.91 MGC, MGB, and MGO
were all Delaware corporations domiciled in and subject to corporate income tax
. .
in Virginia.92
The corporate structure of Media General and its affiliates is critical to
understanding the implications of South Carolina's novel use of combined
reporting-Media General was the sole shareholder of MGC, which owned
MGO, which, in turn, owned MGB. 93 Together, the corporations leveraged one
another's television, newspaper, and online products and information, thereby
exhibiting a "unity of management, ownership, and control of operations." 94
The Department levied corporate income tax assessments against Media
General (the parent company), and two of its subsidiaries, MGB and MGC, by
asserting a Geoffrey nexus over the royalty income produced by the
corporations' intangible assets.95 The Department apportioned the corporations'

89. Id. at 141, 694 S.E.2d at 526.
90. See id. at 140-41, 694 S.E.2d at 526.
91. Id. at 141-42, 694 S.E.2d at 526.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 141, 694 S.E.2d at 526. During the audit period, MGC owned intangible assets
used in MGO's multistate operations, which included operations in South Carolina. See id. Also,
MGC owned all of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licenses for operating
broadcasting affiliates in South Carolina, as well as other intangibles. See id. Similarly, during this
period, MGO used some of MGB's intangibles in South Carolina, which included all FCC licenses,
intellectual property, or other authorizations for two CBS television broadcasting affiliates and one
UPN broadcasting affiliate. See Brief of Respondent at 3-5, Media Gen., 388 S.C. 138, 694 S.E.2d
525 (No. 2007-AL-17-00089-CC). In addition, in 2000, MGI acquired Spartan Communications,
Inc., which included twelve television stations as well as the MGB intangibles. Id. at 4. Pursuant
to license agreements, in 1999 and 2000, MGC and MGB licensed their intangibles to MGI and
charged MGI a flat royalty fee in exchange for its use. Id. at 5. Under three separate ten-year
sublicensing agreements, MGI sublicensed the intangibles to MGO for a royalty fee equal to a
percentage of its revenues from operations, which included operations conducted within South
Carolina. See id. at 5-6. Further, MGB retained control over the license agreements and managed
the license funds under a 1999 Administrative Services Agreement with MGB and MGC. See id. at
7.
95. See Media Gen., 388 S.C. at 142-43, 694 S.E.2d at 526-27.
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income using the separate reporting method,96 after which the taxpayers timely
filed petitions seeking the use of combined reporting under section
12-6-2320(A)(4). 97 The Department stipulated that although combined reporting
fairly represented the corporations' business activities in South Carolina, it
lacked the authority to implement combined reporting.98
2.

Legal Analysis and Interpretation

On appeal from the Administrative Law Court (ALC), the South Carolina
Supreme Court first addressed whether the ALC properly held that the use of
combined reporting was consistent with the plain meaning of the distortion
provision.9 As a matter of interpretation, the Department asserted that the
Code's definition of "taxpayer" referenced a single corporation, and thus
narrowly restricted the distortion provision's applicability to the separate entity
method.100 However, the court rejected the Department's textual argument, and
instead relied on the Oregon Supreme Court's holding in Coca Cola Co. v.
DepartmentofRevenue.101

In Coca Cola, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that, even though UDITPA
does not expressly allow for combined reporting, neither does it prohibit the
Multistate Tax Commission and its member states from using combined
reporting. 102 The court explained, "While it is true, as plaintiff points out, that
the statute speaks of taxpayer in the singular, this is no bar."1 3 Despite the
Oregon statute's reference to a singular taxpayer, in Zale-Salem, Inc. v. State Tax
Commission,104 the court had broadly construed the definition and approved of
combined reporting for multiple taxpayers;105 thus, the court's holding in Zale-

96. Id. at 142, 694 S.E.2d at 526. Because the three taxpayers' income in Media General
was derived from intangible business assets, the Department utilized the gross receipts statutory
separate apportionment formula. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2290 (2000). Unlike the standard
three-factor apportionment, see § 12-6-2250, repealed and replaced by S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-62252 (Supp. 2010), the gross receipts formula requires a simple apportionment fraction where gross
receipts produced by businesses in South Carolina are divided by the entity's gross receipts
everywhere, and then multiplied by the entity's total taxable income, § 12-6-2290.
97. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2320(A)(4) (2000); Media Gen., 388 S.C. at 143, 694 S.E.2d
at 527.
98. Media Gen., 388 S.C. at 143, 694 S.E.2d at 527.
99. Id. at 148, 694 S.E.2d at 530 ("If a statute's 'terms are clear and unambiguous, they must
be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense, unless it fairly appears from the
context that the Legislature intended to use such terms in a technical or peculiar sense."' (quoting
Etiwan Fertilizer Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 217 S.C. 354, 360, 60 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1950))).
100. Id. at 148-49, 694 S.E.2d at 530 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-30-1 (2000)).
101. See id. at 148-149, 694 S.E.2d at 530 (citing Coca Cola Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 533
P.2d 788, 793 (Or. 1975)).
102. Coca Cola Co., 533 P.2d at 793 n.4 (quoting Frank M. Keesling, A Current Look at the
Combined Report and Uniformity in Allocation Practices,42 J.TAX'N 106, 109 (1975)).
103. Id. at 793.
104. 391 P.2d 601 (Or. 1964).
105. Id. at 602.
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Salem supported its conclusion in Coca Cola.106 The Oregon courts'
construction provided the supreme court in Media General with the necessary
support to similarly recognize combined reporting under South Carolina's
distortion relief provision.
Further, the Department of Revenue asserted that its construction should be
given deference on the grounds that the General Assembly had failed to
expressly provide for combined reporting in the distortion relief provision.los
Consequently, the Department asserted it was without authority to use combined
reporting under the relief provision. 109 The ALC had disagreed and denied
deference to the Department after finding that the Department's interpretation of
the relief provision undermined legislative intent.1 10 The South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the ALC and noted, "where, as here, the plain language
of the statute is contrary to the agency's interpretation, the Court will reject the
agency's interpretation."111 Given the court's strict adherence to legislative
intent for fair apportionment, its holding was highly foreseeable.1 12
Finally, the Department argued (to no avail) that South Carolina precedent
favored the denial of combined reporting under section 12-6-2320(A)(4).
In
support, the Department cited to NCR I and NCR II.114 Because both NCR I and
NCR II had rejected the use of combined reporting, the Department argued that
they "remain[ed] good [law] for the proposition that South Carolina is a separate
entity taxing state." 115 However, the South Carolina Supreme Court found
neither NCR I nor NCR II controlling because the General Assembly adopted
section 12-6-2320 in 1995, after the court issued its narrow decisions in those
cases. 116
Ultimately, Media General provides a constitutional means of assessing
flows of value among related companies in corporate income tax apportionment
through combined reporting under section 12-6-2320(A)(4), while also
effectively suppressing tax avoidance in South Carolina. Accordingly, South
Carolina may now impose a more impartial corporate income tax where proof of
distortion exists.

106. See Coca Cola Co., 533 P.2d at 793.
107. See Media Gen., 388 S.C. at 149, 694 S.E.2d at 530 (citing Coca Cola Co., 533 P.2d at
793 n.4).

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 150, 694 S.E.2d at 531 (quoting Brown v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 354 S.C. 436, 440, 581

S.E.2d 836, 838 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. See id. at 151-52, 694 S.E.2d at 531-32.
113. See id. at 150, 694 S.E.2d at 531.

114. See id.
115. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. See id. at 150-51, 694 S.E.2d at 531 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2320 (2000)).
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III. THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED MEDIA
GENERAL

Several compelling reasons support the South Carolina Supreme Court's
conclusion in Media General that the distortion provision in section 12-6-2320
permits the use of combined reporting. First, before the Media General decision,
in Carmax Auto Superstores, the ALC had broadly construed the distortion
provision and permitted the novel use of bifurcated apportionment as a method
that would fairly represent the taxpayers' business activities in South Carolina.117
Additionally, application of the combined reporting method promotes fairness
and alleviates the burdens on closely held corporations and other small
businesses that (unlike large multistate corporations) cannot strategically avoid
state income taxation. 18 Finally, illustrations and examples involving passive
investment companies, captive real estate investment trusts, and transfer pricing
provide further evidence that supports the use of combined reporting as a method
for fair corporate income tax apportionment in South Carolina. 119
A. Broad Department and Taxpayer Discretion Under Section 12-62320(A)(4): Carmax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc. v. South
CarolinaDepartment of Revenue

In its Carmax ruling, issued on April 22, 2010, the ALC approved the South
Carolina Department of Revenue's request to invoke section 12-6-2320 because
the statutory formula did not "reflect fairly the extent of the taxpayer's business
[activity] in South Carolina." 120 Specifically, Carmax Auto Superstores West
Coast, Inc. (the taxpayer and a subsidiary of Carmax, Inc.), operates Carmax
retail stores in California, Nevada, and Utah, while Carmax Auto Superstores,
Inc. (a "related subsidiary") has stores on the East Coast, including in South
Carolina. 121 Collectively, the taxpayer, Carmax Auto Superstores, and other
subsidiaries of Carmax, Inc. had utilized an East-West tax avoidance scheme,
under which the taxpayer licensed the use of intangible property to Carmax Auto
Superstores and received royalty payments (which Carmax Auto Superstores

117. Carmax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, No. 09-AiLJ-170160-CC (S.C. Admin. Law Ct. Apr. 22, 2010).
118. See TRAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 164. See generally Michael Mazerov & Mark
Enriquez, Vast Majority of Large Maryland CorporationsAre Already Subject to "Combined
Reporting" in Other States, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 7 (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/l 1-9-10sfp.pdf ("Small (often family-owned) corporations doing most or
all of their business in the state in which they are located generally do not have the resources to set
up 'Delaware Holding Companies,' 'captive REITs,' and other tax shelters that exploit the absence
of combined reporting in the state. But their large, multistate corporate competitors do." (footnote
omitted)).
119. See TRAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 163-64.
120. Carmax, slip op. at 4, 11 (quoting § 12-6-2320(A)).
121. Id. at 2.
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subsequently deducted from its income on its South Carolina corporate income
tax returns). 122 In 2004, Carmax Auto Superstores and the taxpayer transferred
assets and intangible property, respectively, to Carmax Business Services, LLC
(CBS)-a flow-through entity and another subsidiary of Carmax, Inc.-that in
return paid Carmax Auto Superstores and the taxpayer with a percentage interest
in income distributions of CBS. 123
Although the taxpayer had calculated its taxable income utilizing the
statutory "three-factor double weighted sales formula," the Department of
Revenue imposed bifurcated apportionment as an alternative method after an
audit revealed that the taxpayer's corporate income tax return "failed to reflect
fairly the extent of the taxpayer's business in South Carolina.124 The
Department's alternative formula "divided the taxpayer's income from royalties
and financing from within South Carolina by the taxpayer's royalty and
financing receipts from all locations in which it does business."1 25 From this
formula, the Department determined the ratio of the taxpayer's income that was
properly taxable in South Carolina. 12 6 Consequently, no apportionable retail
income from within South Carolina was attributable to the taxpayer,127 and the
taxpayer could no longer intentionally inflate the denominator in the
apportionment formula in an effort to fictitiously decrease its gross receipts.128
In sum, the ALC concluded that the Department's use of an alternative
bifurcated method was both constitutional and reasonable.129 Accordingly,
Carmax illustrates that South Carolina courts have broad discretion to approve
the use of alternative apportionment methods under section 12-6-2320 in order to
ensure a fair corporate income tax.

122. Id. at 2-3 ("The taxpayer's business structure provides it with a significant state tax
benefit, and shares features with the structures of other multi-state taxpayers who divide their retail
operations into 'East' and 'West' operations and similarly benefit from this structure in the form of
state tax savings." (footnote omitted)).
123. See id.
124. Id. at 4; see also id. at 6 ("The taxpayer, in both its original and amended returns for the
years at issue, utilized standard apportionment formulas delineated by statutes-§§ 12-6-2250 and
12-6-2290, respectively. The Department's findings determined that neither method fairly reflected
the extent of the taxpayer's business in South Carolina. The auditor proposed an alternative
apportionment method pursuant to § 12-6-2320(A).").
125. Id. at 4-5.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 8 ("The mixing of the royalty payments with retail income produced a
significantly lower apportionment ratio than that of the taxpayer's royalty income considered alone.
The Department described this as a dilution of the apportionment ratio, and described the
consequent reduction of the taxpayer's tax liability as a distortion of tax owed." (footnote omitted)).
129. See id. at 11, 18.
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B. Advancing Parity and Sound Policy in State Corporate Tax

A significant motivating force behind states' increasing adoption of the
combined reporting method derives from notions of fairness. 13 Unlike separate
entity states, where "intrastate companies are at a disadvantage since they cannot
take advantage of holding company loopholes," as a combined reporting state,
South Carolina could thwart the tax-avoidance attempts of multistate
corporations, which would place all corporate taxpayers within the state "on
equal footing."131 Households and small businesses, which lack the resources to
engage in interstate tax-shifting, are left to foot the bill that many multistate
corporations are able to intentionally avoid in the states that have not enacted
combined reporting. 132 Combined reporting helps remedy this problem because
it restores neutrality and accounts for the apparent tendency of large multistate
corporations to obtain essential public benefits and services at little to no cost. 13 3
Simply, combined reporting apportions a unitary group's entire income among
the states where it conducts substantive business activities.134
By contrast, separate reporting provides only a partial accounting of a
unitary group's business income, which may not accurately reflect the income
attributable to the taxing state.135 Consider, for example, Butler Bros. v.
McColgan,136 where an Illinois corporation had utilized a central buying division
to obtain favorable prices for its seven wholesale distributing houses, including
one located in California.137 The United States Supreme Court upheld
California's corporate franchise tax because the state was "justified in assuming

130. See Mazerov, State CorporateTax Shelters, supra note 19, at 1.

131. TRAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 164.
132. See INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, THE ITEP GUIDE TO FAIR STATE AND LOCAL

TAXES 44-46, 50 (2011) [hereinafter ITEP GUIDE], available at http://www.itepnet.org/pdf/guide.
pdf; Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 1. See generally Fox et al., supra

note 9, at 139 ("[S]tates in fact want to collect corporate income taxes on both multistate and fully
domiciled business, but want to do so in light of a very competitive environment for business and
the tax base."). According to one source, as of November 2010, combined reporting had been
adopted in twenty-three of the states that have a corporate income tax. See Combined Reporting,
THE NEW RULES PROJECT, http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/level-playing-field-taxation/
combined-reporting (last visited May 15, 2011) [hereinafter NEW RULES PROJECT]. In addition to
the District of Columbia, the states that had not adopted combined reporting included: Virginia,
Tennessee, South Carolina, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, Ohio, North Carolina, New

Jersey, New Mexico, Missouri, Mississippi, Maryland, Louisiana, Kentucky, Iowa, Indiana,
Georgia, Florida, Delaware, Connecticut, Arkansas, and Alabama. Id.
133. See Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 1. See generally ITEP

GUIDE, supra note 132, at 44 ("[J]ust as working families and individuals benefit from the services
that state and local governments provide, so too do corporations.").
134. See ITEP GUIDE, supra note 132, at 49-50; Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters,

supranote 19, at 1.
135. Michael J. McIntyre et al., Designing a Combined Reporting Regime for a State
CorporateIncome Tax: A Case Study ofLouisiana,61 LA. L. REv. 699, 704 (2001).

136. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
137. Id. at 504.
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that the [California] branch contributed its aliquot share to the advantages of
centralized management of this unitary enterprise and to the net income
earned." 13 8 Thus, the Court held that combined reporting is a constitutional
method of allocating to the taxing state "its just proportion of the profits earned"
by a unitary group's business activities. 139
California's use of a combined reporting method recognized the close
integration among the taxpayer group's various branches through their reliance
on the operation of the central buying division.140 The Court explained, "There
is unity of ownership and management[:] operation of the central buying division
alone demonstrates that functionally the various branches are closely integrated.
Admittedly, centralized purchasing results in more favorable prices being
obtained than if the purchases were separately made for the account of any one
branch."1 4 1 Notably, combined reporting accounted for the fact that the Illinois
central buying division clearly contributed to the California entity's
profitability.
On the other hand, in cases with facts similar to those in Butler
Bros., separate reporting (using a Geoffrey nexus) would fail to capture "the
synergies, interdependencies, and sharing of knowledge, know-how, and
experiences that are typical features of a unitary business."
Therefore, in the
all-too-common scenarios such as that in Butler Bros., separate reporting may
inequitably favor large multistate corporations.144
As shown in Media General, when separate reporting produces an unfair tax
assessment on an entity within a unitary group, applying the combined reporting
method to the group's combined income (rather than to each separate entity) has
a dramatic effect on state income tax liability. 141 With the combination of
income across a unitary group, highly profitable entities-which would
otherwise bear inordinate state corporate income tax liabilities-may discount
their own tax liabilities by their related entities' losses.146 Thus, in addition to
capturing corporate group synergies and securing a fair corporate income tax for
small businesses, combined reporting can present a desirable offsetting effect to
many related companies in a unitary business.147

138. Id. at 509.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 508.
142. See id. at 508-09.
143. McIntyre et al., supra note 135, at 704.
144. See ITEP GUIDE, supranote 132, at 49-50; TRAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 164.
145. See Media Gen. Commc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 388 S.C. 138, 146-51, 694
S.E.2d 525, 529-31 (2010).
146. McIntyre et al, supra note 135, at 715 ("In general, a group of corporations would prefer
combined reporting if one member of their unitary combined group has suffered a loss and the loss
otherwise would not be useful to them.").
147. See id.
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C. Combined Reporting and Modern Tax Avoidance

In 2003, the former Director of the South Carolina Department of Revenue,
Burnet R. Maybank, stated:
There are very real and very painful state budget deficits in America
today and it is apparent that the revenue shortfall in many states is
significantly larger because of tax sheltering. This comes at a time
when states are struggling to provide quality education for children, safe
communities and basic infrastructure to support their economies.148
Today, devoid of any other business rationale, many corporate tax strategists will
often simply liquidate a subsidiary or incorporate a division to avoid state
corporate income taxes.149 For instance, BDO Seidman, LLP (an accounting and
consulting firm with a large tax advisory practice) recommends several
strategies, such as using transfer pricing, for reducing state taxes,150 as does
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, another accounting firm that advises its clients
on how to avoid state income taxes. 151 Of course, there are other examples of
the countless schemes that corporate tax advisers use to minimize (and distort)
state corporate income taxes.
Many states that have considered combined reporting estimate an increase in
their corporate income tax receipts ranging from 10 to 25%. 152 Moreover, state
tax experts have written that "combined reporting would help the corporate
income tax become a more significant source of revenue.

. .

. [It] would severely

limit the ability of corporations to use tax planning techniques such as creating
nowhere income and establishing passive investment companies to avoid state
corporate tax liability." 53 Among the countless methods by which multistate

148. Press Release, Multistate Tax Comm'n, Study: Corporate Tax Sheltering Linked to as
Much as $12.4 Billion in Lost State Tax Revenues (July 15, 2003), available at
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/MultistateTaxCommission/Resources/Studies and Reports/C
orporate Tax Sheltering/July%/o2015,%o202003%/o20newso20release.pdf.
149. BRUNORI, supra note 4, at 132.
150. See Michael Mazerov, A Majority of States Have Now Adopted a Key Corporate Tax
Reform- "Combined Reporting," CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 6 (rev. 2009)
[hereinafter Mazerov, Tax Reform], http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-5-07sfp.pdf.
151. See NEW RULES PROJECT, supra note 132. See generally State and Local Tax,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 1 (2007), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/state-local-tax/assets/salt tax

overview 2007.pdf ("The PricewaterhouseCoopers State and Local Tax (SALT) practice is
dedicated to helping its clients assess their state and local tax burden by recommending solutions
that support their overall business objectives and provide support so that their filing positions are
consistent with good business practices and with the states' applicable tax laws and rules.").
152. Mazerov, State CorporateTax Shelters, supra note 19, at 7.
153. David Brunori & Joseph J. Cordes, The State CorporateIncome Tax: Recent Trendsfor a
Troubled Tax, AM. INST. OF TAX POL'Y, 26 (Aug. 15, 2005), http://www.americantaxpolicy

institute.org/pdf/StateCorpTaxo208-15-05%o20

2 .pdf (citing Michael Mazerov, Closing Three

Common CorporateIncome Tax Loopholes Could Raise Additional Revenue for Many States, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 6 (rev. 2003), http://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/4-9-02sfp.pdf).
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corporations effectively avoid the corporate income taxes of separate entity
reporting states, the most prevalent include passive investment companies,
captive real estate investment trusts, and transfer pricing schemes. 15 4 This
Section illustrates how combined reporting can effectively nullify many of these
avoidance practices.
1. The Passive Investment Company
Under a passive investment company (PIC) scheme (which has also been
termed the Delaware holding company scheme), such as the one involved in
Geoffrey, a group of related companies will incorporate a subsidiary in a state
that either does not impose an income tax on intangible assets (such as
Delaware), or one that levies no corporate income tax at all (such as Nevada).155
The subsidiary-effectively a shell company with no material value-owns the
company's trademark, and the related companies, which generate operating
revenue, pay a royalty fee to the subsidiary and deduct that fee as a business
expense.
The related companies thus offset their income in the states where
they conduct business activities, so that the shifted income is essentially tax
free. 157
By 1998, some 6,000 PICs were incorporated in Delaware, with new ones
emerging at a rate of around 600-800 each year. ss For instance, Delaware PICs
held by the "Limited/Victoria's Secret/Lane Bryant/Express retail conglomerate
earned $949 million in royalty income between 1992 and 1994 by licensing the
companies' trademarks back to the stores." 15 9 Similarly, a Michigan-based PIC
of Kmart "earned $1.25 billion in royalty income between 1991 and 1995."160
Applying the problem of PICs as a tax-avoidance strategy to South Carolina,
which has a 5% corporate income tax rate,161 every $100 million that
corporations shift to tax haven states yields a $5 million loss in state tax
revenues. 162
Some corporations-mainly financial institutions-also use PICs for asset
isolation.163 Essentially, if a bank invests loan proceeds in intangible assets that
earn income from outside of the corporate group (such as mortgage-backed

154. See NEW RULES PROJECT, supra note 132. See generally ITEP GUIDE, supra note 132, at

49 ("Not surprisingly, separate accounting is subject to abuse by large, multistate companies. In
fact, it's an open highway for corporate tax avoidance.").
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Mazerov, Tax Reform, supra note 150, at 5.
See id.
See id.
Mazerov, State CorporateTax Shelters, supranote 19, at 7.
Id.

160. Id. (citing In re Kmart Properties, Inc., No. 01-287446-006, 2000 WL 35357230, at *12
(N.M. Tax. Rev. Dep't Feb. 1,2000)).
161. See Padgitt,supra note 75, at 13.
162. See Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 7.
163. See id. at 9.
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securities), it can transfer the income to a PIC and thereby avoid having that
income taxed in separate entity states.164 States such as Delaware and Nevada do
not tax the interest income, which the PIC can pay out to members of the
corporate group through a loan.165 Consequently, the related companies can
"shift additional
profits to the PIC in the form of tax-deductible interest paid on
166
loan."
the
2.

The Captive Real Estate Investment Trust

Another income-shifting mechanism that has recently received more
widespread attention involves the use of captive real estate investment trusts
(REITs).167 By definition, REITs are established under federal law and can only
invest in real estate and related real estate assets.168 Additionally, REITs must
maintain at least 100 investors and "must annually pay out at least 90 percent of
their earnings to their investors." 169 REITs can also deduct dividends paid out to
investors, thereby potentially eliminating any income tax liability. o In the
typical captive REIT scenario, a corporation creates a subsidiary that meets the
REIT qualifications, transfers ownership of assets, such as store location
buildings and land, to the REIT, and then pays rent to the REIT.
The
corporation can then deduct the rent as a business expense, and "siphon profits
out of its operational arm and into the REIT, which is effectively tax-exempt."1 7 2
Nevertheless, "[a] properly structured combined-reporting law will nullify
captive REITs and many other tax-avoidance strategies that rely on shifting

164. See id.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 11. According to the Wall Street Journal, between 1998 and 2001, Wal-Mart
avoided $350 million in state income tax payments on $7.27 billion in rent income that Wal-Mart
and Sam's Club stores had paid to the company's REITs. See Jesse Drucker, Friendly Landlord:
Wal-Mart Cuts Taxes by Paying Rent to Itself WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007, at Al. Moreover, states
that do not use combined reporting could not have taxed the amounts paid out by the Wal-Mart
REITs:
Not only do the parent corporation's rental payments to the REIT reduce the taxable
profit of stores located in non-combined reporting states, but these states cannot tax the
income of the REIT when it is paid out in the form of dividends to the parent because the
dividends are first paid to a second Wal-Mart subsidiary, a Delaware PIC. When that
subsidiary pays out its REIT dividend income in the form of dividends to the parent, the
otherwise taxable REIT dividends are converted into general corporate dividends, which
are tax exempt in almost all states.
Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 25 n.28.

168. See I.R.C. § 856 (2006); Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 11.
169. Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 11.
170. See id.

171. See id. at
172. Id. at 12.

11

-12.
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profits within a multi-corporate group by ensuring that such shifts have no effect
on the group's total tax liability." 17 3
Although federal law does not permit corporations to deduct dividends
received from REITs, many states allow the "dividends-received deduction" for
subsidiary and sister corporations.174 Moreover, corporations may be tempted to
combine their REITs with PICs in an attempt to produce greater tax savings.175
Some non-combined reporting states have considered combined reporting for
REITs, or have alternatively disallowed the dividends-received deduction to
counteract tax avoidance efforts.176 In its 2010 report, the South Carolina Tax
Realignment Commission recommended the adoption of combined reporting, but
urged the disallowance of all deductions for related party REITs as a reform
measure in the event that the legislature chose to retain separate reporting.177
3.

Transfer Pricing

Finally, another common tax avoidance strategy used in separate reporting
states involves transfer pricing-a mechanism whereby corporate groups with
businesses, none of which have a nexus with the same state, can minimize their
tax liabilities.17 8 In the case of a corporate group consisting of a manufacturer
and a distribution subsidiary, the transfer price is the price at which the
manufacturer sells products to the subsidiary, and the corporation may be able to
manipulate the transfer price to avoid higher tax rates. 179
The following example illustrates the operation of transfer pricing as
between a manufacturing plant in North Carolina, which has a corporate income
tax rate of 6.9%,18o and a subsidiary located in South Carolina, which sells the

173. Id. at 13.
174. Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 12. Compare I.R.C.

§ 243(a)

(2006) ("In the case of a corporation, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount ... received
as dividends from a domestic corporation . . . ."), with §243(d)(3) ("Any dividend received from a
real estate investment trust which, for the taxable year of the trust in which the dividend is paid ...
shall not be treated as a dividend."). Thus, the 90 percent (or more) of earnings that REITs pay out
as dividends are taxable to investors under the federal income tax because dividends paid by an
REIT to another corporation fall under an exception to the general rule of deductibility and are
ineligible for "the dividends-received deduction." Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra
note 19, at 12. On the other hand, many states do not have a similar exception in their corporate
income tax codes, which creates a loophole for REITs' income to go untaxed in some states. See id.
175. See Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 13.

176. See id. ("A few non-combined reporting states, including Maryland and Kentucky, have
already enacted targeted legislation aimed at nullifying corporate tax savings from captive REITs.").
177. See TRAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 169-70.
178. See Mazerov, State CorporateTax Shelters, supranote 19, at 19.

179. See id. ("The corporation has substantial discretion to set its transfer prices in a way that
minimizes its total tax liability, as long as both the plant and its out-of-state customers are located in
non-combined reporting states."). For an illustration of the difference between a high transfer price
and a low transfer price, see infra Appendix B.
180. See Range of State CorporateIncome Tax Rates, FED'N OF TAX ADM'RS, 1 (Feb. 2011),
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/corp inc.pdf.
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final product subject to the state's 5% corporate income tax.181 The transfer
price between the manufacturer and subsidiary will be set low, such that there is
only minimal income to the manufacturer. This will result in more income being
taxed at 5% (rather than 6.9%), thereby reducing the total tax liability of the
corporate group as a whole.
The manufacturer may also practice "nexus isolation" in addition to transfer
pricing.182 A somewhat obscure federal law provides that states cannot impose
income taxes on a manufacturer or wholesale distributor if the corporation limits
its activity to "solicitation of orders." 8 3 As a result, the North Carolina
manufacturer-by limiting its actions merely to soliciting orders-can set an
artificially high transfer price as between itself and the South Carolina
subsidiary, thereby reducing taxable income in South Carolina for the overall
corporate group.184 Although separate reporting states remain vulnerable to
transfer pricing schemes, combined reporting states are unaffected because
transfer prices will not affect the corporate group's overall profits.185
Overall, in fiscal year 2001, corporate tax sheltering schemes such as
transfer pricing reduced state corporate income tax revenues by more than onethird of collections, or an estimated $12.38 billion.186 In fiscal year 2001, South
Carolina alone reportedly lost $80 million in state revenue because of tax
sheltering, or approximately 41.67% of $192 million in actual collected tax
revenue.
Moreover, in 2005, South Carolina harbored 122 captive
corporations aimed at avoiding the state corporate income tax;188 that number is
probably even higher today. 9 Thus, the Media General court was correct
insofar as combined reporting under South Carolina's corporate income tax
distortion relief provision will help nullify many intercompany tax avoidance
mechanisms-such as PICs, captive REITs, and transfer pricing-by combining

181. See id.

182. Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 15 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 381(c) (2006). One state tax expert explains, "Public Law 86-272, enacted in
1959, allows a corporation selling physical goods in a state to do so without creating corporate
income tax nexus if its activities in the state are limited to 'solicitation of orders."' Mazerov, State
Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 16; see also Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73
Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 381).
184. See Mazerov, State CorporateTax Shelters, supra note 19, at 16.

185. See Fox et. al, supra note 9, at 147.
186. See MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N, CORPORATE
STATE

CORPORATE

INCOIE

TAX

REVENUE

TAX SHELTERING AND THE IMPACT ON
COLLECTIONS 1, 2 (2003), available at

http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/MultistateTaxCommission/Resources/Studies
orporate Tax Sheltering/Taxo20Shelte/o20Report.pdf.
187. See id. at 3 tbl.1.

and Reports/C

188. See Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 15.
189. See generally Lynnley Browning, Vermont Becomes 'Offshore' Insurance Haven, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at Cl ("More than 560 United States companies, including Wal-Mart Stores,
Starbucks and McGraw-Hill, have set up Vermont-based entities to insure their biggest risks and
liabilities, giving them a tax benefit in the process.").
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the profits of unitary businesses, and accounting for economies of scale and
unquantifiable transfers of value.
IV. COMBINED REPORTING AND FAIR REPRESENTATION UNDER SECTION

§ 12-6-

2320(A)(4)
In states that have adopted UDITPA section 18, the statute has not been
uniformly applied. 190
Proposals to apply section 18 necessarily involve two inquiries-whether
distortion exists and whether the alternative apportionment method is reasonable
in comparison to statutory methods. 191 Highly diverse standards abound in state
distortion challenges-courts in California and Michigan employ a "clear and
convincing evidence" standard, 192 Oregon applies a well-defined "preponderance
of the evidence" standard,193 and Utah, devoid of any specific standard, employs
a fact-intensive inquiry in each case. 194 Very few states-for example, Illinois,
Georgia, and Florida-apply a "clear and cogent" evidence test, which is a
higher constitutional standard of distortion.196
The most instructive method for determining distortion appears in Microsoft
v. Franchise Tax Board.197 In Microsoft, the California Supreme Court required

not only a showing of disparity of taxable income from apportionment, but also
demanded a quantitative and qualitative analysis to show distortion.198
Additionally, in Twentieth Century-Fox v. Department of Revenue, the Oregon

Supreme Court articulated an intensive three-prong test that is instructive in
determining whether alternative apportionment is reasonable. 199

190. See Diann L. Smith & Richard C. Call, MTC Section 18 Regulations: Recurring
Challenges to the NonrecurringRule, TAX ANALYSTS: A PINCH OF SALT, 67, 68 (Apr. 6, 2009),

http://www.sutherland.com/files/Publication/23df5f22-c2c2-45fb-9162-5ddf28424d14/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/f9b9el7d-8df3-4df4-8cdl-ble95674fd93/Pinch040609.pdf.
191. See UNL DiV. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT

§

18 (1957).

192. See Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 139 P.3d 1169, 1178 (Cal. 2006); Donovan
Constr. Co. v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 337 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
193. See Crocker Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 838 P.2d 552, 557 (Or. 1992);
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 700 P.2d 1035, 1042-44 (Or. 1985).
194. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 493 P.2d 632 634-36 (Utah 1972).
195. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.12C-1.0152 (2000); GA. CoMP. R. & REGS. 560-7-7.03(5)(e)(4) (2005); Miami Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 571 N.E.2d 800, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978)); Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dep't of
Revenue, 549 N.E.2d 598, 602 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
196. See Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1931).
197. 139 P.3d 1169 (Cal. 2006).
198. See id. at 1182-83.
199. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 700 P.2d 1035, 1043 (Or.
1985).
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The Lack of Uniformity in Recognition of Distortion under UDITPA
Section 18

Presently, no uniform standard exists for determining apportionment
distortion under UDITPA section 18.200 The party invoking UDITPA section 18
generally bears the burden of proving distortion-that statutory apportionment
does not "fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activity." 201 In
South Carolina, the critical issue when applying section 12-6-2320(A)(4) is the
line of "equitable allocation and apportionment." 202 Because the Department of
Revenue in Media General stipulated to the fairness of the taxpayers' distortion
203
whether corporate income tax distortion exists in the context of
argument,
comparing combined reporting to statutory separate reporting remains an open
question in South Carolina.
In an attempt to provide guidance for interpreting section 18, the Multistate
Tax Commission (MTC) in 1973 adopted its regulations on "Allocation and
Apportionment," which stated that alternative apportionment should "be invoked
only in specific cases, where unusual factual circumstances (which ordinarily
will be unique and non-recurring) produce[] incongruous results." 204 Of the
states that adopted the 1973 model regulations, California notably incorporated
the MTC's exact language into its code.205 Nevertheless, in 2006, the California
Supreme Court in Microsoft stated that while the distortion relief provision
"ordinarily 2 a plies to nonrecurring situations, it does not apply only to such
situations.
The court further explained that "the statutory touchstone remains

200. See Smith & Call, supra note 190, at 68-69.
201. UNIF. DIv. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT

§ 18(A)(4)

(1957); see also S.C. CODE

ANN. § 12-6-2320 (2000) (providing the same).
202. See Media Gen. Commc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 388 S.C. 138, 145-46, 694
S.E.2d 525, 528-29 (2010) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2320(A)(4) (2000)).
203. Id. at 146, 694 S.E.2d at 529.

In Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123

(1930), the United States Supreme Court held that, as applied to the facts of the case, North
Carolina's statutory apportionment method "operated unreasonably and arbitrarily, in attributing to
North Carolina a percentage of income out of all appropriate proportion" to the taxpayer's business
conducted in the state. Id. at 135. There, the percentage of the taxpayer's average income that
resulted from business transacted within North Carolina was approximately 17%, but using the
North Carolina statutory apportionment method, the state had attempted to levy taxes on
approximately 80% of taxpayer's income. See id. at 134. In Media General, use of the South
Carolina statutory apportionment method produced taxable income of $3,758,320, while combined
reporting yielded taxable income equal to $863,179-a significant difference analogous to the
constitutional finding of distortion in Hans Rees' Sons. See Media General, 388 S.C. at 142-43,
694 S.E.2d at 527.
204. Memorandum from Joe Huddleston, Exec. Dir., Multistate Tax Comm'n, to MTC
Compact Member State Representatives (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.mtc.gov/
uploadedFiles/Multistate Tax Commission/Uniformity/UniformityProjects/Current Projects/byla
w7surveySecl8reg.pdf; see also Smith & Call, supra note 190, at 68.
205. See Smith & Call, supra note 190, at 68 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 25137(a)
(2008)).
206. Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 139 P.3d 1169, 1181 (Cal. 2006).
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an inquiry into whether the formula 'fairly represents[s]' a unitary business's
activities in a given state, and when it does not, the relief provision may
apply." 207 The California court's language in Microsoft thus indicates minimal
adherence to the regulation. Accordingly, it is apparent that Regulation
IV.18(A) has had a de minimis effect, if any, on when states should allow
alternative apportionment under section 18.
In a 2008 MTC state survey, nearly every state responded that the language
in the section 18 regulation "was too restrictive and that it could limit an
adopting state's ability to apply alternative apportionment." 20 8 However, when
specifically asked about section 18, six of the thirteen states that participated in
the survey posited that the regulation should only apply to situations involving
"gross distortion," and eight states requested a provision requiring the party
seeking alternative apportionment to carry the burden of proof.209 The survey
thus proved that the application of section 18 had become all but uniform. 2 10 In
July 2010, the MTC revised the section 18 regulation to allow for "a departure
from the allocation and apportionment provisions of Article IV only in limited
and specific cases where the apportionment and allocation provisions contained
in Article IV produce incongruous results."211 This language suggests a more
liberal application of section 18-in line with the states' 2008 survey responsehowever, taxpayer uncertainty persists, even following this recent revision.
Accordingly, the South Carolina Department of Revenue should issue a
Revenue Ruling explaining when distortion exists under section 12-6-2320.212
For now, multistate corporations filing income taxes in South Carolina face
uncertainty as to whether a comparison of combined reporting and separate
reporting can produce distortion under section 12-6-2320, and-given the lack of
uniformity regarding UDITPA section 18-referencing the standards of other
states in which corporations conduct business activities is unlikely to provide
insight as to South Carolina's distortion standard.
B. Standards for Proving Distortion Under UDITPA Section 18 and a
ReasonableAlternative
In Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., the Oregon Supreme Court set forth a

multi-faceted

"preponderance

of the evidence"

standard

for equitable

207. Id.at 1181-82.
208. Smith & Call, supra note 190, at 68.

209. Id. at 69.
210. See id.
211. MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION REG. IV. 18(a)(4)(2010).
212. See generally S.C. DEP'T OF REVENUE, Revenue Ruling 08-01,

available at

http://www.setax.org/NR/rdonlyres/D7C8161C-3764-45BA-99BB-BEC5C8D354A/O/RRO81.pdf
("The purpose of a Revenue Ruling is to provide guidance to the public and to Department
personnel. It is an advisory opinion issued to apply principles of tax law to a set of facts or general
category of taxpayers. It is the Department's position until superseded or modified by a change in
statute, regulation, court decision, or another Departmental advisory opinion.").
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apportionment under UDITPA section 18.213 First, the party invoking the
distortion relief provision must show "that the statutory formula as a whole does
not 'fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this
state."' 214 This first step requires an inquiry into each of the apportionment
factors, because in certain cases the activities may fairly represent business
activity as a whole.215 Additionally, the party must show that statutory
apportionment does not adequately reflect business activity-not simply that
statutory apportionment does not reflect income earned in the state. 216 Second,
the party must show that the alternative method is reasonable under UDITPA
section 18. 217 The court's reasonableness inquiry requires that:
(1) the division of income fairly represents business activity and if
applied uniformly would result in taxation of no more or no less than
100 percent of taxpayer's income; (2) the division of income does not
create or foster lack of uniformity among UDITPA jurisdictions; and (3)
the division of income reflects the economic reality of the business
activity engaged in by the taxpayer in Oregon. 2 18
Thus, Twentieth Century-Fox expounds on the UDITPA section 18
reasonableness component.
In contrast to Oregon's detailed standard under section 18, the Utah
Supreme Court did not apply a separate standard to demonstrate distortion and a
reasonable alternative in Kennocott Copper v. State Tax Commission.219 There,
the court allowed departure from the statutory property, payroll, and sales
apportionment method on the grounds that it did not fairly represent the
taxpayer's business activity in Utah during the assessment period. 220 Similarly,
221
in BellSouth Advertising and Publishing Corp. v. Chumley,

the Tennessee

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the Commissioner had
met the burden of proof needed to allow a variance against the taxpayer; it never
actually discussed the specific requirements of that burden,222 however.
In Donovan Construction Co. v. Michigan Department of Treasury,223 the

Michigan Court of Appeals applied the "clear and convincing evidence" standard
for invoking UDITPA section 18. 224 The court agreed that "the mere fact that

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

700 P.2d 1035, 1044 (Or. 1985).
Id. at 1042.
See id.
See id. 1042-43.
Id. at 1043.
Id.
493 P.2d 632 (Utah 1972).
See id. at 635.
308 S.W.3d 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
See id. at 367.
337 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
Id. at 300.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 9

772

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62: 743

separate accounting disclosed a greater tax liability was insufficient to invoke the
relief provisions."
Instead, similar to the holding of Twentieth Century-Fox,
the court required the plaintiff to show that "the formula does not fairly represent
the extent of the taxpayer's business activities within the state. To do so requires
an attack on each element of the formulary apportionment." 226
California recently applied this formulaic standard in Microsoft, where its
supreme court stated that the Franchise Tax Board had the "burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the approximation provided by the
standard formula is not a fair representation, and (2) its proposed alternative is
reasonable." 2 27 Specifically, the Board had argued that short-term securities
investments of Microsoft's treasury department in the state of Washingtonwhich produced under 2% of the company's business income but 73% of gross
receipts-substantially overloaded the denominator of the sales apportionment
factor in the statutory three-factor apportionment formula.228 The inclusion of
investment income in the sales factor's denominator reduced the percentage of
overall sales attributed to California.229 Noting that if the UDITPA relief
provision did not apply here it "would create a significant loophole exploitable
through subtle changes in investment strategy," the California Supreme Court
held that mixing the gross receipts from the short-term investments with gross
receipts from Microsoft's other business activities seriously distorted the
statutory formula's apportionment. 230 Commentators suggest that, given the
court's detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis, the clear and convincing
evidence test in Microsoft is the best approach for proving distortion.231
C. Proving Distortion and Combined Reporting as a Reasonable
Alternative in South Carolina

Ultimately, the standards articulated in Microsoft and Twentieth CenturyFox help provide a necessary measure of predictability to South Carolina
corporate income taxpayers and the Department of Revenue for arguing
distortion and combined reporting as a reasonable alternative. Under Microsoft,
the party invoking section 12-6-2320(A)(4) should be able to show both
qualitative and quantitative distortion in order to utilize combined reporting as a
reasonable equitable apportionment alternative.2 32 In addition, the three-prong
test set forth in Twentieth Century-Fox provides a clear and thorough mandate

225. Id.
226. Id. at 301.
227. Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 139 P.3d 1169, 1178 (Cal. 2006).
228. See id. at 1182.
229. See id.

230. Id.
231. See Geoffrey J. Christian & James S. Helms, A Perspective on Change-Where Does
FairApportionment Stand?, J. OF ST. TAX., Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 23, 25-26 (citing Microsoft Corp.,

139 P.3d at 1169).
232. See Microsoft Corp., 139 P.3d at 1182-1183.
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for proving combined reporting as a reasonable apportionment alternative.
However, CarMax, Chumley, and Kinnecott seem to indicate that the burden of
proving distortion may be lower (or nonexistent) when arguing for alternative
apportionment as "any other method." 233
While Media General provides a step toward a fair corporate income tax in
South Carolina, outside South Carolina the focus is on the decision's meaningful
guidance for section 18 states that have yet to consider combined reporting as
alternative apportionment.2 34 Foremost, Media General promotes the ability of
multisate corporations to apply combined reporting in separate entity states that
have enacted section 18.235 Although the MTC's model regulation provides that
alternative apportionment under section 18 should be reserved for "unusual
factual circumstances" that produce "incongruous results," CarMax, Media
General, and the range of other cases applying section 18 suggest that the
regulation is not thoroughly enforced.
V. THE SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD ENACT COMBINED
REPORTING

State tax experts argue that "[t]he corporate income taxes of non-combined
reporting states are fatally flawed,"236 and that the most effective means of
strengthening the state corporate income tax base is by adhering to the Multistate
Tax Compact, whose member states require combined reporting.237 In the
interest of achieving a fair and uniform corporate income tax in South Carolina,
the next step rests with the General Assembly, which should enact combined
reporting as a comprehensive corporate income tax reform solution.
A.

The South CarolinaTax Realignment Commission's 2010 FinalReport

In its December 2010 Final Report prepared for the South Carolina General
Assembly, the South Carolina Tax Realignment Commission (TRAC) addressed
the effectiveness of separate and combined reporting, and stated, "The most
definitive way for dealing with separate entity reporting is through new
legislation that will change South Carolina's tax structure to a combined
reporting system." 238 Addressing a main concern, TRAC's analsis suggested
that combined reporting would not inhibit state economic growth.

233. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2320(A)(4)(2000).

234. See Christian & Helms, supra note 231, at 28.
235. See id. (citing Leathers v. Jacuzzi, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 252 (Ark. 1996)).
236. Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 22.

237. See, e.g., BRUNORI, supra note 4, at 150 ("The adoption of the Multistate Tax Compact
and the efforts of the Multistate Tax Commission have helped create uniform tax laws and
procedures that reduce compliance burdens and minimize the possibility of double taxation.").
238. Id. The impetus is that comprehensive apportionment reform legislation, rather than
litigation, "would be definitive and not subject to corporations altering their corporate structure to
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Importantly, the TRAC report stated that combined reporting would not
cause multistate corporations to cease business activities in South Carolina
because twenty-three of the forty-five states that currently impose a corporate
income tax utilize combined reporting; many of the twenty-two non-combined
reporting states have legislation allowing for elective use of combined reporting;
and most corporations already conduct business in combined reporting states.
Moreover, total state and local taxes paid by corporations only represent about
2.5% of corporate annual expenses.241 Correspondingly, interstate differences in
labor, energy, and transportation costs have a far more significant impact on
corporations' business investment decisions than would a state's shift to
combined reporting.242 Further, many of the states that have adopted combined
reporting are among the most economically developed, including New York and

California. 2 43
Ultimately, TRAC concluded that "[c]ombined reporting is a way to avoid
discrimination against certain businesses, to tax income that would otherwise be
shifted out of state, and to deal with the growing complexities of the current
corporate climate."244 TRAC urged either an
across the board requirement that all corporations and unitary businesses
with nexus with the state file a combined report, [or] forced combined
reporting, which authorizes the Department of Revenue to compel
corporations to file combined reports should it be determined that doing
so better reflects the income of a corporation. 24 5
VI. CONCLUSION

Over the past twenty years, the use of prevalent tax avoidance schemes by
multistate corporations to successfully shift their income and avoid tax liability
under South Carolina's separate reporting regime has diminished the
effectiveness of the South Carolina corporate income tax as a fair assessment on
corporations conducting business activities in the state. In turn, South Carolina's
small businesses have been left to foot the bill. However, by allowing combined

constantly fit within the shifting or narrowing allowable loophole as determined by cases like
Geoffrey." Id.
239. Id. at 166.

240. Id. at 166-67.
241. Mazerov & Enriquez, supranote 118, at 7.
242. See id.
243. See Mazerov, State Corporate Tax Shelters, supra note 19, at 1). Significantly, research

also indicates that seven of the eight states with net manufacturing job gains during the previous two
business cycles from 1990-2007 utilized combined reporting. Mazerov & Enriquez, supra note
118, at 6.
244. Id. at 169.
245. Id.
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reporting in cases of distortion, the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
Media General provided a critical step toward neutrality for all corporate income
taxpayers in South Carolina. Going forward after Media General, multistate
corporations still face uncertainty as to when distortion will exist such that the
Department of Revenue may require combined reporting as "any other method"
because separate reporting does not "fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's
business activity in this State." 246 Consistent with the guidance provided by,
among others, the United States Supreme Court, the South Carolina Tax
Realignment Commission, and state tax experts, the South Carolina General
Assembly should consider enacting combined reporting in the interest of
ultimately securing a fair corporate income tax.
RichardI. Simons

246. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2320(A)(4)(2000).
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APPENDIX A247

Suppose Corporation A and Corporation B form a unitary group with operations only in the United Stal
corporations have no inter-company transactions and both have business activities in South Carolina. Further, as,
following apportionment figures and total taxable income:

A

B

Combined

South Carolina Sales
Total United States Sales

$2,000
$5,000

$10,000
$15,000

$20,000

South Carolina Property
Total United States Proper

$2,000
$5,000

$10,000
$15,000

$20,000

South Carolina Payroll
Total United States Payroll

$1,000
$5,000

$2,000
$10,000

$15,000

Taxable Income Total

$2,000

$15,000

$17,000

$,$1,0-

00

247. The hypothetical scenario presented in this illustration is similar to one presented by Professors Richard Pomp and Oliver Oldman in theii
on taxation. See 2 RICHARD D. POMP& OLIVER OLDMAN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 10-11 (5th ed. 2005).
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Combined Reporting Corporate Income Tax Assessment Formula
1

(

A's in - state payroll ) + (A's

A's in - state sales

(comb. total taxable income)

()comb.
total U.S. sales) + (comb. total U.S. payroll

in - state proper

comb. total U.S. prope

Separate Reporting Corporate Income Tax Assessment Formula

(A's in - state sales

1(
(A's total taxable income)

U-

(2) Asi-stesas
A's U.S. sales

A's in - state payroll

+
+

A's in - state property

(+(_________
A's U.S. payroll

A's U.S. property

Corporation A's Combined Reporting Corporate Income Tax Assessment

($17,000)

(2) $2,0

($ 0 ) $20,000) +

= $2,691.67

$2,000

$20,000) + $15,000

Corporation A's Separate Reporting Income Tax Assessment

(($2,000~
($2,000)
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)+

5,000

$2,000

($1,000

$5,000

$5,000

=

$700.00
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APPENDIX B

Suppose a corporation has a manufacturing plant in North Carolina, where the corporate income tax rate is 6.99
a subsidiary in South Carolina that sells the final product subject to the South Carolina's 5% corporate income ta
If the manufacturer provides the goods to the subsidiary at a low transfer price, the manufacturer will have minima
and the corporation will have less total tax liability because more of its income will be taxed at 5% rather than at 6.'
figures below show the difference between selling the goods at a high transfer price versus a low transfer price.
High Transfer Price

LOSTI01

UzOOGs

Transfer Price
Profit

Oia

LOSTI01

)3,UUU,UUU
$7,000,000
$2,000,000

Manufacturer Taxes: $138,000 ($2,000,000
Corporate Group Total Taxes: $238,000

OOGs

Sales Price
Profit
x

6.9%)

oia

1 /,UUU,UUU
$9,000,000
$2,000,000

Subsidiary Taxes: $100,000 ($2,000,000

x

5.0%)

248. See Range of State CorporateIncome Tax Rates, FED'N OF TAX ADM'RS, 1 (Feb. 2011), http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/corpinc.pdf.
249. See id.
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Low Transfer Price

LOST 01 tzooas
Transfer Price

Profit

301a

IjooGs 301a

bJ,UUU,UUU

LOST OI

$5,200,000

Sales Price

$9,000,000

$200,000

Profit

$3,800,000

Manufacturer Taxes: $13,800 ($200,000
Corporate Group Total Taxes: $203,800
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x

6.9%)

5,/UUUUU

Subsidiary Taxes: $190,000 ($3,800,000

x

5.0%)
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